Abstract Carbon markets, like other commodity markets, are volatile. They react to stochastic "disequilibrium" spot prices, which may be affected by inadequate policies, speculations and bubbles. The market-based emission trading, therefore, does not necessarily minimize abatement costs and achieve emission reduction goals. We introduce a basic stochastic model integrating emissions reduction, monitoring and trading costs allowing us to analyze the robustness of emission and uncertainty reduction policies under environmental safety constraints asymmetric information and other multiple anthropogenic and natural uncertainties. Explicit treatment of uncertainties provides incentives for reducing them before trading. We illustrate functioning of the robust market with numerical results involving such countries as the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, EU27, Russia, Ukraine. In particular, we analyze if the knowledge about uncertainties may affect portfolios of technological and trade policies or structure of the market and how uncertainty characteristics may affect market prices and change the market structure.
abatement, uncertainty reduction and by redistributing the emissions permits through trading. Safety constraints imposed on the trades require that the reported emissions plus uncertainty are below the targeted level (cap) with a given probability, therefore this creates incentives for parties to invest into uncertainty reduction prior to compliance. Proposed mutually beneficial bilateral trading scheme corresponds to a special distributed optimization method. The implementation of this trading scheme is discussed in section 4 using a computerized multiagent trading system avoiding irreversibility of real trades and asymmetric information of partners.
Different uncertainties affect emission trading in different ways, which may cause market crashes and instabilities similar to financial markets. To limit the role of uncertainties, advocates of regulated trades argue in favor of uncertainty indicators distinguishing sources by their uncertainty levels (Kerr 2000; Godal et al. 2003) , which is usually their private information. Therefore, the use of these indicators is similar to the ideas of "signaling" well known in treating the asymmetric information (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts 1986) . Market regulators may set restrictions on source category to be included in trading, and trading scheme may demand a party to set source-specific targets depending on the level of uncertainty.
Emissions cap and trade programs (de Jong and Walet 2004; Kerr 2000) are economic instruments for environmental regulations which become popular both among policy-makers and scientific communities (Stavins 2010) . These programs are now a key element in climate change policy negotiations establishing carbon prices as a "new currency" and emission permits as a new asset type (Kerr 2000) .
In theory, the market price of tradable emissions permits (allowances) should set up the marginal cost of emissions reductions to meet the cap. In reality, the market prices exhibit periods of high volatility which may be a result of political decisions, information disclosure, speculations. The short-term information about spot prices in different periods may be contradictory and cause parties to revise their "myopic" decisions which, however, may not be reversible. As studied by Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (Roos 2011) , immaturity of the existing market policies triggered a major "dash for coal setting out on the construction of dozens of new coal plants. …". Also, in the Netherlands, "… CO2 emissions trading is a marginal consideration in the choice of fuel. Evidently, electricity producers are not too bothered about the price they pay for carbon emissions. The vast majority still favors coal, the worst carbon polluter. The reason is simple: the expected costs of emission rights are negligible compared to other investment outlays." The building of coal-fired plants now will lock-in energy decisions for about 40 years (Stikkelman et al. 2010) .
Lessons learned from the existing emission trading (Betz and Sato 2006) point out the need for market safety regulations to smoothen its performance.
In this paper, we propose a computerized multiagent trading system (COMATS) which may function as a prototype of a real decentralized emission trading market under uncertainty without revealing the private information of parties about costs and emissions. The system may enhance real markets by analyzing conditions for strategic robust trades and stable market's performance avoiding potential irreversibility and "lock-in" equilibriums. COMATS is designed as a multicomputer network of traders and can be viewed as a device for decentralized collective regulation of trades towards their cost-effectiveness under safety constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the classical approach to emission trading and discusses its shortcomings in situations with uncertainty. In section 3 the integrated stochastic multiagent model is introduced and analyzed. Section 4 outlines the structure of the COMATS and summarizes numerical results on trading involving such countries as US, Australia, Canada, Japan, EU27, Russia, Ukraine, etc. In this section we show how the knowledge about uncertainties may affect structure of the market, e.g., turn buyer into seller, and how new participants may improve or destabilize market's performance. Conclusions are presented in section 5.
Emission trading under uncertainties
Emission trading as an economic instrument for environmental regulations has been analyzed e.g. by Dales (1968) . The author assumed that environmental agency requires each regulated source to submit permits (also known as quotas, credits, or allowances), which are transferable. Each source reduces its emissions until the cost for one more unit of emissions reduction is higher than to buy a permit. If the permit market is perfectly competitive, then marginal abatement costs will be equal to the permit price and therefore equal across all regulated sources.
The equality of marginal abatement costs is a necessary condition for any given level of environmental quality to be achieved at the lowest overall cost, a condition known as costeffectiveness. Putting a price on carbon was a crucial step towards market-based regulations of climate policies. Montgomery (1972) showed that market instruments may achieve their environmental objectives at lower information requirements than conventional commandand-control systems. Therefore, encouraged by economists (Stavins 2010; Kerr 2000; Baumol and Oates 1975; Dales 1968) , the idea of carbon trading markets becomes increasingly popular for global climate change control. The theoretical conclusion of the cost effectiveness is based upon assumption that emissions can be measured objectively and that noncompliance to environmental goals may be verified and penalized (de Jong and Walet 2004) .
Unfortunately, the existence of various exogenous and endogenous inherent uncertainties violates traditional pricing concepts and raises serious concerns regarding the ability of existing carbon trading markets to fulfill their main purpose-to control climate changewithout creating world-wide irreversible socio-economic and environmental disruptions.
Emissions uncertainties vary in shape and duration depending on their origin (see de Jong and Walet 2004 and discussion in Ermolieva et al. 2010b) . Large variability of emissions may easily cause their underreporting requiring regulations as in the following section. A comprehensive discussion of uncertainties and their implications can be found in the volume by Lieberman et al. (eds.) (2007) and in Gillenwater et al. 2007 . Some characteristics of uncertainties can be derived after revisions of the historical emissions time series following "The Good Practice Guidance" report of the IPCC (2000). In particular, Winiwarter and Muik (2010) explore uncertainties for total emissions in Austria 2005. Figure 1 shows probability density distribution which is most strongly influenced by the lognormal distribution of the uncertainty in N2O (in CO2 equivalent) emissions. Non-normal character of this distribution illustrates the need for new regulations avoiding standard mean-variance analysis suitable only for normal distributions.
Although data improve and the requirements for measuring emissions are being clarified, some source characteristics are inherently uncertain to be measured with accuracy. There will always be different levels and shapes of uncertainties in their estimates. This raises a fundamentally important issue about developing proper approaches to emission trading under uncertainty providing endogenous forces for uncertainty reduction.
Stochastic model for robust emission trading
In the following section, we introduce a distributed optimization model incorporating uncertainty and risk-based regulations into emission trading system. The model imposes stability requirement by using appropriate safety constraints to control the level of admissible uncertainty which would guarantee with desirable probability the necessary emissions reduction targets (e.g., post-Kyoto pledge targets).
This type of safety constraints is used in pollution control, financial applications, stability regulations in the insurance industry, reliability theory, and catastrophic risks management (see, e.g. discussion in Ermolieva and Ermoliev 2005; Ermolieva et al. 2010a) . In a sense, they reduce the reported emissions reductions to a verifiable level with a given probability.
The model is decomposed into interdependent submodels: individual parties' models and a social planner model. First, for a fixed amount of permits, each party solves its individual problem by defining how much resources to spend on abating emissions and uncertainty reduction to satisfy safety constraints on emissions targets with desirable probability. This problem does not require information on other parties. Second, the social planner decides on the redistribution of permits minimizing the total (social) cost, which involves the knowledge of costs functions of all parties. This information is private and therefore the specific methodology of decentralized (distributed) optimization is applied. The model can be viewed as a prototype to simulate an emission trading market that is regulated in a decentralized way .
Party's model
Let us denote the uncertainty of reported emissions x i as random variable ξ i (x i , ω i ), where ω i is a vector of all uncertainties (scenarios) affecting emissions of party i. The uncertainty ξ i (x i , ω i ) can be reduced by investments in new production technologies and monitoring mechanisms under additional safety constraints, which can be written as
for all parties i. Here Q i denotes a required safety level ensuring the probability of emissions x i and uncertainties ξ i (x i , ω i ) do not exceed emission target K i adjusted by tradable (positive or negative) permits y i , ∑ i=1 n y i =0. Safety level Q i is imposed by regulatory agency to ensure robust performance of the market. In this paper we don't consider verification mechanisms. We assume that Q i corresponds to varifiable level of (1) is typicaly used for regulating varifiable standards, when it is impossible to evaluate monetary losses from their violations that would allow to use penalty functions. Convex CvaR risk measures implicitly induce these constraints. The discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of the paper, Yet, necessary detailes can be found in (Ermoliev and von Winterfeldt 2012; Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000) . Safety constraints (1) can be also written in the form of equivalent deterministic nonlinear constraints. Let us define quantile z i (x i ) as the minimal z such that
Then the following equivalent constraints can be substituted for the safety constraint (1):
where variable u i is associated with the level of uncertainty remaining after investing in monitoring and other technologies that may reduce the uncertainty ξ i (x i , ω i ) of emissions. Let us note that indicator u i corresponds to probabilistic versions of "signaling" used for coping with asymetric information (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts 1986) . Equation (2) show that safety constraints induce risk-related upper bounds z i (x) on uncertainty dependent on reported emissions level x i and characteristics of uncertainty ω i . For the individual optimization problem, we define the least costs function f i (y i ) for party i, i = 1, ……, n i , (to comply with imposed safety requirements (2) with fixed permits y i and the target K i ) as the minimum of expected total emission reduction costs c i (x i , ω i ) and uncertainty reduction costs d i (u i , ω i ) for a given permit y i :
Let us note that in general costs of emissions reductions and monitoring costs are not separable, i.e., instead of c i (x i , ω) + d i (u i , ω) we have to consider a total cost function of the form C i (x i , u i , ω) that does not affect the following analysis. In fact, similar functions are used in section 4. Cost functions C i (⋅,⋅,⋅) have a complex structure usually defined implicitly by solving specific nested optimization models (similar to the definition of function f i (y i )). In section 4 we use for this purpose the GAINS model (Amann 2009; Wagner and Amann 2009; Wagner et al. 2012) .
The main issue now concerns cost-effective allocation of permits y i under asymmetric information about cost functions f i (y i ), i.e. solution of the following problem.
Social planner model
The social planner (environmental agency) needs to find the permit vector y = (y 1 , …, y n ) or distribution of permits among parties minimizing the total (social) cost
This means that the total allocation of permits remains the same as at the initial state, i.e., (4)- (5) could be easily solved by the social planner if private information on cost functions and uncertainties is available. The absence of information on total cost function F(y) requires developing specific decentralized optimization procedures which can be viewed as sequential bilateral emission trading processes.
The convergence study of these processes is based on the following market equilibrium conditions. Assume that f i (y i ), i=1, …, n, is continuously differentiable and strongly convex function. Then, from the Lagrangian minimization L(y,λ) =∑ i=1 n f i (y i ) −λ∑ i=1 n y i , a trade equilibrium is defined as the vector y = (y 1 , …, y n )satisfying the following equations:
From condition (6) it follows that the marginal value of a permit in equilibrium is equal to a λ same for all parties. Unlike the standard optimization models, the optimality conditions (6) cannot be directly used because parties don't reveal private information about functions f i , i.e. function F(y) is not known.
Bilateral negotiations
Our procedure resembles bilateral trades negotiation process when any two parties exchange emissions permits in a mutually beneficial way. Before presenting a step-by-step algorithm let us briefly outline theoretical background of this procedure, more details can be found in Ermolieva et al. 2010a . The convergence of this procedure requires f i (y i ) to be strongly convex continiously differentiable functions which can be often achieved by slight, practically equivalent, modifications of f i (y i ). 
for small Δ. This equation demonstrates that bilateral trade reduces the aggregate costs for sources i and j. From (7) for small Δ we also have important inference:
i.e., the new distribution of permits reduces costs of j more than increases the cost of i. Hence j is able to compensate i for the increased costs in a mutually beneficial way, what is discussed in the next section.
For the convergence of the outlined procedure the value Δ at each step k, Δ = Δ k , must equalize marginal costs of parties i and j, i.e., f i
Let us summarize the corresponding procedure more precisely in a step-by-step way:
Step 0: Let y increases amount εν of buying permits from party j for a small δ and ν=1, 2, …, ν k , for
Step k+1 This algorithm operates by using marginal values of publically unknown at each iteration function F(y) and values y l =y l k . Essential assumption is the reversibility of trades that is addressed in section 4.
The value λ k can be viewed as an equilibrium price at step k. Let us note that price process λ k is driven endogenously by total (emissions and uncertainty reduction, and trading) cost-minimizing decisions of meeting parties, what is fundamentally different from standard models of financial markets with instanteniously observable prices.
During the process, marginal costs and prices will differ between the sequential trades, but finally the trading system converges to an equilibrium y*=(y 1 * ,…,y n * ), λ * with marginal costs of all parties equal to equilibrium price as in (6). The proof of the convergence is for example in (Ermolieva et al. 2010a) .
Formally, the algorithm converges in the following sense. Assume that f i (⋅), i=1, 2, …, n, are strongly convex functions. Then for any ε>0, there is a δ ε >0 such that the distance ‖(λ k ,y k )−(λ*,y*)‖ between (λ k , y k ) and the equilibrium (λ * , y * ) is less than ε for large k.
Redistribution schemes
From (8) it follows that at each step k trading parties i, j can redistribute joint cost by using some variables φ i k+1 and φ j k+1 reducing initial costs of these parties in mutually beneficial manner:
Therefore at the equilibrium y*=( y 1 * ,…,y n * ) parties will deal actually with payments φ i * <f i (y i 0 ) such that the following equation is satisfied:
where I = {1, …, n}. From this equation follows the Pareto efficiency of φ*=(φ i * ) i=1,…,n , i.e., a value φ i * cannot be decreased without increasing some other value φ j * , i ≠ j, to satisfy this equation. An important question is whether the grand coalition I of parties is stable, i.e., the following equation is also satisfied:
for any other coalition C ⊆ I. Accordingly, a distribution of payments φ * is a core solution if it satisfies these two equations. This is a well-known game-theoretic concept (see e.g., McCain 2010), where F c corresponds to a coalition function. In the case of bilateral trades the core solution reflects the following intuitively evident fact: if new parties join a coalition C creating a larger coalition I, parties from C would be able to proceed with the trading process and reduce their costs further. Formally speaking, the bilateral trading procedure for coalition I allows to find the equilibrium price λ * and a vector y*=( y 1 * ,…,y n * ) minimizing the Lagrangian L(y, λ * ) with L(y*,λ*)=∑ i=1 n (f i (y i * )−λ*y i * )=F(y*). Therefore, if function F(y) is convex, then it is evident that the payment redistribution scheme
is a core solution, i.e. it minimizes any partial sum of L(y * , λ * ). In nonconvex cases, if the function F(y) is globally Lipschitz continuous, then the core solution remains the same (see discussion in Evstigneev and Flam 2001) . Unfortunately, the bilateral trading procedure of section 3.3 will not, in general, converge to a global solution. For this, we need to use an appropriate global distributed optimization approach.
Price-based scheme
Let us compare the proposed bilateral trading scheme with a market price-based scheme. This section discusses high sensitivity of price-driven markets to uncertainties restricting to achieve cost-effective and environmentally safe solutions even in convex cases and reversible trades.
A cost-effective and environmentally safe price is a solution of the model which is dual to the primal model (4)-(5). The dual model derives the equilibrium price λ * maximizing the following concave and, in general, non-differentiable (continiously) function
A given market price signal λ decentralizes the solution of internal minimization problem into individual subproblems of parties: find solutions y i (λ) minimizing functions f i (y i )−λy i for each i. In general, solutions y i (λ) don't satisfy the balance Eq. (5), i.e. ∑ i=1 n y i (λ)≠0, therefore the price λ has to be adjusted towards the desirable balance.
To ensure the balances, current λ k at time k=0, 1, … is adjusted proportionally to the imbalance, ∑ i=1 n y i (λ), that is a kind of gradient (subgradient) g'(λ) for continuously nondifferentiable g(λ):
with a step-size ρ k . From the convergence results of quasi-gradient methods (see, e.g., discussion in Ermoliev and Wets 1988) it follows that with ρ k = const/k+1, the sequence λ k converges to the equilibrium price maximizing g(λ). Unfortunately, this type of procedures requires the private information of parties for tracking imbalances ∑ i=1 n y i (λ k ). Uncertainties of markets make problematic achieving cost-effective and environmentally safe allocations of permits by using price-based process (12) even under unrealistic assumption that values ∑ i=1 n y i (λ k ) can be exactly calculated. The convergence of this process to equilibrium price requires rather sophisticated mechanisms for smoothing observable random prices consistently with step-size ρ k (see e.g. Ermolieva et al. 2010a) . In addition to these shortcomings, the main issue for emission trading schemes is the irreversibility of trades restricting to achieve global cost-effective and environmentally safe solutions. For bilateral trades, this is discussed in the following section.
Computerise multi-agent trading system: numerical experiments
The available computing technology allows us to organize a Decentralized COMATS based on model (1)-(5) and bilateral trading procedure of subsection 3.3. A distributed computers network connects computers of parties with the computer of a central agency. Using a graphical user interface, parties store private information on cost functions and other characteristics of the model defined by Eqs. (1)- (5) including specific probability distributions and scenario generators characterizing uncertainties of emissions and other parameters.
The central agency imposes market regulations in the form of safety constraints on environmental targets. Following the procedure in section 3.3, the computer of the central agency "picks up" at random, a pair of parties i, j and in anonymous manner, as it is discussed in subsection 3.4, "negotiates" with computers of parties Δ k and vector y k solving (9). Then, another pair of parties is picked up and the negotiations are repeated. These calculations can be easily organized without revealing private information of parties, in particular, due to distributed among different computers data of parties. The process goes on until equilibrium (λ * , y * ) is reached. The equilibrium solution can then be analyzed and implemented in reality using redistribution schemes discussed in subsection 3.4. Therefore at the first stage COMATS evaluates equilibrium prices and permits, whereas at the second stage the equilibrium tradable permits y * are implemented. The information about the equilibrium price λ * identifies also the core solution (section 3.4.) defining stable coalition of parties. It means that no party has the incentive to leave the coalition or terminate participation at any intermediate step. COMATS is of benefit both for parties and for the market. For parties, the prototype emission trading enables the analysis of the balance between robust cost-efficient and environmentally safe trades and emissions abatements. For the market, it allows to impose safety regulations ensuring stability and fair functioning without shocks.
In what follows, we discuss the implications of uncertainties on market structure by using COMATS. To analyze performance of COMATS numerically, we use relevant to (1)-(5) data on the costs of emissions reduction from the GAINS model (Amann 2009; Wagner and Amann 2009; Wagner et al. 2012) for the following countries and groups of countries Australia, Canada, EU27, Japan, Norway, Russia, Ukraine, USA. The marginal cost curves (of emissions reduction as a percent of pledge targets) are displayed in Fig. 2 . Table 1 shows reported emissions levels in 1990 and 2009. Projected (baseline) countryspecific emissions levels in 2020 are derived from the GAINS model, and the pledge emissions reduction targets in 2020 are set according to (Wagner and Amann 2009) . The data on emissions uncertainties and costs of reducing uncertainties are compiled from IPCC, Nahorski et al. 2007 Nahorski et al. , 2010 Obersteiner et al. 2000; Godal et al. 2003; Winiwarter and Rypdal 2001; Winiwarter 2007; Wagner and Amann 2009; Wagner et al. 2012 . We employ uncertain emissions level in the year 2020 as percentage of the reported business as usual emissions level in 2020. Table 2 illustrates the results of emission permit trades among seven countries ignoring uncertainties. In equilibrium, the cost of reducing reported emissions (also optimal price of emissions permit) is about €13 per tC, which is consistent with existing market trends (www.pointcarbon.com). Total costs of emissions reduction to targeted levels without trades are defined by "Costs for mitigation without trades", while "Costs after trades" stands for optimal costs for emissions abatements and trades. Financial advantages of trading are estimated by comparing the two alternatives. Optimal total ("core") costs of parties are calculated according to formula (10). In these experiments, no emission uncertainties are included, therefore no costs are spent on uncertainties reduction, i.e. "unc. reduction" equals 0. Russia and Ukraine are major permits' sellers (negative values of trades), and it is explained by their emissions levels in 2020, which are lower than pledge targets.
Results of a scenario involving uncertainties are presented in Table 3 . Optimal marginal cost of reducing unit reported emissions equals the cost of reducing unit uncertain emissions and is about € 25 per tC, which is almost twice higher than in the case when uncertainties are not included in calculations. The higher costs are due to more abatements as the uncertainties are now accounted for in the verification of targets compliance according to (2). Optimal marginal costs also increase because in this case Russia and Ukraine invest in uncertainties reduction and therefore can offer less traded permits at zero price than in the scenario without uncertainties.
In the scenario when uncertainties are explicitly included in the trading, the US turns to a permit supplier. This is due to two reasons. First, the US marginal cost curve is a flatter slope than other countries. Second, because the assumed uncertainties in the US are relatively low. In this scenario, as Table 3 also shows, Russia and Ukraine invest in monitoring to reduce the uncertainties around targets and, therefore, supply less permits than in the case without uncertainties. Although the results have illustrative purpose, the conclusion is that the equilibrium price of emissions permits highly depend on uncertainties. (Wagner and Amann 2009) In both scenarios, with and without uncertainties treatment, the "core" solution derived at equilibrium makes all parties better off. Total profits from trades equal about 71.3 and 213 Billion €, in case without and with uncertainty, respectively, which is 19 % and 23 % higher, for without and with uncertainties, than in the situation without trading.
Distortions to the emissions trading system may be caused by individual characteristics of market players. For example, as Table 4 indicates, participation of the US in EU ETS is of major benefit. The market without the US has much higher marginal cost (if compared to Table 3 ) due to rather steep cost curves and high demands in permits (except for Russian and Ukraine) of the other traders.
Concluding remarks
In theory, the emission price of tradable permits should establish the marginal cost of emissions reductions to meet the cap. In reality, the existence of various exogenous and endogenous inherent uncertainties violates this traditional deterministic pricing concept. Lessons learned from the existing emission trading schemes point out the need for the market's safety regulations smoothing its performance. Proposed in this paper multi-agent approach integrating regulations of carbon emissions and uncertainties with redistribution of emissions through emission trading under safety constraints allows us to design a computerized multiagent trading system that may function as a prototype of a robust emission trading market. The model explores conditions of market's stability with respect to uncertainty by using appropriate safety constraints controlling verifiable uncertainty reductions which would guarantee cost efficiency of trades and safety levels of emission reduction targets (e.g., post-Kyoto pledge targets). We illustrate functioning of the robust market with numerical results involving such countries as the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, EU27, Russia, Ukraine, etc. Explicit treatment of uncertainties may significantly affect portfolios of technological and trade policies, market prices and change the market structure. We conclude also that exclusion or inclusion of additional players may have dramatic effects on the market.
